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The Geography of the Crown:
Reflections on Mikisew Cree and
Williams Lake
Patricia Burke Wood and David A. Rossiter*

I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we argue for the importance of the geographic
underpinnings of the concepts of “the Crown”, the “honour of the
Crown”, “fiduciary duty”, and the “duty to consult” in cases concerning
Aboriginal title and rights in Canada. Recent decisions, including
Williams Lake1 (2018) and Mikisew Cree2 (2018), while further
developing and refining these concepts, continue to skirt around the
fundamentally geographic issue of territorial sovereignty. We argue that
both political and legal discussions fail to recognize fully how the honour
of the Crown, fiduciary duty, and the duty to consult arise from this
geographical basis, rather than from a legal or abstracted definition of the
Crown. More than a bounded space or a specific site, territory is a
strategic process of settler-colonial statecraft, in which the law is a
constitutive instrument in the unmaking and remaking of territory. The
concepts of the Crown, its honour and its duties are not exempt from this
process.
From the Royal Proclamation of 1763 onwards, imperial actors
employed legal discourse to secure geography, specifically through the
assertion of sovereignty over territory, and thus to legitimate the Crown
and make its largely unpracticed and abstract claims more real. This
*

Patricia Burke Wood is Professor of Geography, York University; David A. Rossiter is
Professor of Geography, Western Washington University. In the drafting of this article, the authors
benefitted greatly from exchanges with Sonia Lawrence, Richard Ogden, Craig Scott, Scott Franks,
Philippe Lagassé, and two anonymous reviewers, as well as the research assistance of Evaleen
Hellinga.
1
Williams Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development),
[2018] S.C.J. No. 4, 2018 SCC 4 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Williams Lake (2018)”].
2
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Governor in Council), [2018] S.C.J. No. 40, 2018
SCC 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mikisew Cree (2018)”].
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assertion was, and continues to be, challenged by pre-existing Aboriginal
political geographies. Even in their efforts to recognize the legitimacy of
Indigenous claims, the courts have strategically deployed and developed
legal concepts to stabilize imperial claims. The Crown, its honour and its
duties are all inventions of British and Canadian law. They emerged for
strategic purposes and are not universal concepts, even among settler
societies formerly part of the British Empire.3 Thus, the historicalgeographic context, particularly settler-colonialism, is essential to
understanding their meaning and application.
Williams Lake (2018) and Mikisew Cree (2018) each provide
opportunities to interrogate the Court’s understanding of the geography
of the Crown. In the former decision, Justices address territorial control
through concepts related to the Crown in two distinct ways – grounded
and abstract. In finding that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty by not
securing the Williams Lake Indian Band village site from encroachment
by settlers in the late 19th century, the Court acknowledges the lived
geographies of use and occupation that the Band has never ceded. At the
same time, the decision relies upon an assertion of an abstract underlying
Crown sovereignty over the territory in question and finds that the
fiduciary duty owed to the Band arises from this assertion. In Mikisew
Cree (2018), these geographies are largely absent. Rather than relying
upon the geographic roots of fiduciary duty and duty to consult in
securing territory, this decision invokes a decontextualized Crown as
governing authority. This a-geographical approach misreads the character
and function of the Crown in Canada.
The unresolved point of tension in both cases is the origin and
legitimacy of the Crown’s assertion of territorial sovereignty. By
introducing a geographic critique of the two decisions and their broader
legal history, we intend to demonstrate that, in the context of settler
colonialism in Canada, “the Crown” is a land claim.

II. THE INVENTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE HONOUR AND
DUTIES OF THE CROWN
The obligation of the Crown’s duty to consult arises, variably, from
the Crown’s fiduciary duty and/or the honour of the Crown. In the 1984

3
Kirsty Gover, “The Honour of the Crowns: State-Indigenous Fiduciary Relationships and
Australian Exceptionalism”, (2016) 38 Sydney Law Review 339-68.
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Guerin4 decision, a case in which the Crown was found to have
consciously behaved in a duplicitous manner towards the Musqueam
Nation in a land surrender and lease arrangement, the unethical
behaviour was described as in breach of the Crown’s “fiduciary duty”.
This duty, the Court argued, arose from the “special relationship”
between the Crown and Indigenous peoples, which was to be one of
mutual trust, not competitive, exploitative or adversarial. Citing the
Indian Act,5 the Court spoke of the Crown’s responsibility to protect and
act in the best interests of Indigenous peoples. Moreover, Aboriginal title
was affirmed as a pre-existing property right, and that land could only be
surrendered to the Crown. Although Aboriginal title was understood as
sui generis, this arrangement made the Crown a trustee, subject to the
same legal obligations as other fiduciary relationships. This assertion of
the Crown’s fiduciary duty was upheld in Sparrow (1990).6 This led to
multiple Indigenous claims that the Crown had failed to fulfil its
obligations and, by the early 21st century, established “the role of the
fiduciary relationship as a cornerstone of Canadian Aboriginal law” that
could protect Aboriginal rights and title.7
For example, fiduciary duty is slightly curtailed, but ultimately
confirmed in 2002 in Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada,8 where Binnie J.
writes that “A fiduciary duty, where it exists, is called into existence to
facilitate supervision of the high degree of discretionary control gradually
assumed by the Crown over the lives of aboriginal peoples”, and such
duties “are shaped by the demands of the situation”. The language of
“called into existence” is significant here. We call into existence things
that do not already exist, but which the circumstances require. Moreover,
the passive voice leaves it unclear who calls the duty into existence. The
Crown? The Court? Who invents this duty and why? If it is “to facilitate
supervision” of the Crown’s control of Aboriginal peoples, then surely it
must be noted that such control and supervision have also been “called
into existence”, rather than negotiated.

4
5
6

(1990)”].

Guerin v. Canada, [1984] S.C.J. No. 45, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 (S.C.C.).
Indian Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 149, s. 18(1).
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow

7
James I. Reynolds, A Breach of Duty: Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2005) 83.
8
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] S.C.J. No. 50, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, 2003
SCC 45 (S.C.C.).
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The duty to consult emerges after Guerin’s clear articulation of a
fiduciary duty, and is further supported by (and, in many ways, arises
from) section 35 of the Constitution Act, which gives constitutional
protection to existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. The duty to consult
was set out in Sparrow (1990) with explicit reference to section 35, and
this was affirmed in Delgamuukw (1997),9 among others. What “the duty
to consult” entailed and whom it obliged were questions that courts took
up largely on a case-by-case basis, noting that the details were affected
by the circumstances.10 The duty to consult was explicitly understood as
part of another court expectation, that of acting in good faith, which was
“viewed as an incident of the Crown’s fiduciary duty”,11 but in
Delgamuukw the Court also recognized the instability of that expectation,
noting that “the Crown is under a moral, if not legal, duty to enter into
and conduct those negotiations in good faith”.
As the duty to consult has often been triggered by the violation of
rights, Lawrence and Macklem advocate for its ex ante use. They also
assert its potential as a strategic instrument to “minimize reliance on
litigation as a means of recognizing and affirming Aboriginal rights,” as
a means of identifying those rights in the first place, as having “the
objective of creating incentives on the parties to reach negotiated
settlements”, and on the Crown “to establish processes for interdepartmental scrutiny of the adequacy of consultation …. and to develop
a coordinated strategy to seek to avoid litigated outcomes”, and perhaps
even a springboard to a “jurisprudence of Reconciliation” or “an
instrument that fosters reconciliation”.12 It is clear that the Courts have
consistently encouraged the Crown to enter into consultation and
negotiation wherever possible, and avoid litigation. It is also worth
noting that “the duty to consult” has accumulated “several distinct
theoretical foundations” which do not always align, and these differences
contribute to the overall churn and emergent quality of Aboriginal law.13
The fiduciary relationship as a protector of Aboriginal rights and title
is not without critique. Richard Flannigan sees the invention of this
special fiduciary duty in Guerin as having “no support or foundation of
9

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 1113.
11
Sonia Lawrence and Patrick Macklem, “From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal
Rights and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2000) 79 Canadian Bar Review 271.
12
Id., 255, 258, 260, 261, 267.
13
Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, 2d ed. (Saskatoon:
Purich Publishing, 2014) 34-35.
10
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any kind in the conventional fiduciary jurisprudence”,14 and argues it is
an instrument of the court in its efforts to constrain sovereign power.
“The wrong was simply a failure by the trustee to act according to the
terms of the trust. There was only a trust law (nominate) issue. That issue
had nothing to do with the nature of Indian title, unconscionability or,
indeed, the fiduciary responsibility of the Crown.”15 Jamie Dickson has
gone further to assert that the idea of a fiduciary relationship has
“reinforce[d] a paternalistic and constitutionally immoral power
structure”.16
In 2004, this inadequate or unnecessary fiduciary responsibility was
“eclipsed” in the Haida Nation decision with a more explicit idea of “the
honour of the Crown”, from which, it argued, flows fiduciary
responsibility and the duty to consult.17 This was baldly restated in Rio
Tinto (2010): “The duty to consult is grounded in the honour of the
Crown.”18 Fiduciary duty had already been linked in Sparrow to the
honour of the Crown. In the decision of Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J.,
the Court said that “a legislative objective must be attained in such a way
as to uphold the honour of the Crown and be in keeping with the unique
contemporary relationship, grounded in history and policy, between the
Crown and Canadaʼs aboriginal peoples”. David Arnot has read the
“honour of the Crown” as inherent in fiduciary duty, calling it “a rebuke
of government privilege” and suggesting that it “restored the ancient
concept of holding ministers to a standard of fair dealing that stands
above and outside the black-letter law”.19 Dickson argues that the
“attempted use of non-conventional fiduciary concepts in Aboriginal law
failed” and that the courts have tried to replace them with the idea of the
honour of the Crown. The difficulty in the switch is that the former was
not explicitly thrown out and replaced.20

14
Richard Flannigan, “The Boundaries of Fiduciary Responsibility” (2004) Canadian Bar
Review 83:1, 65.
15
Id., 61, n. 71,
16
Jamie D. Dickson, The Honour and Dishonour of the Crown: Making Sense of
Aboriginal Law in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press and Purich Publishing, 2015) 9.
17
Id., 10.
18
Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC
43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, at para. 32 (S.C.C.), cited in Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to
Consult Aboriginal Peoples, 2d ed. (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014) 167.
19
David Arnot, “The Honour of the Crown,” 60 Saskatchewan Law Review, 1996, 340.
20
Jamie D. Dickson, The Honour and Dishonour of the Crown: Making Sense of
Aboriginal Law in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press and Purich Publishing, 2015), 149.
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The honour of the Crown is an old concept whose history is relevant,
but not directive in its present application in cases concerning Aboriginal
rights and title: “The development of the honour of the Crown doctrine in
Canada is and will be a novel, contemporary project.”21 It is widely
acknowledged that its honour is not always evident in the Crown’s
actions, and that it is an aspirational or even hollow concept. In Badger
(1996), the Court found that “the honour of the Crown is always at stake
in its dealings with Indigenous people [i.e., not just treaties]. It is always
assumed that the Crown intends to fulfill its promises. No appearance of
‘sharp dealing’ will be sanctioned.”22 Prior to Haida Nation (2004),
consultation was commonly restricted to established rights, but by the
late 1990s, courts were expanding its use. Echoing Lawrence and
Macklem’s call for ex ante application of the duty to consult, Haida
Nation (2004) asserted an expansive approach as necessary to uphold the
honour of the Crown, and cited the New Zealand Government’s 1997
Guide For Consultation with Maori at some length, including its explicit
call to consult at the “proposal” stage, ahead of any decision-making.
Brian Slattery considers the “honour of the Crown” as one of “three basic
elements of Aboriginal law” (the other two are the Royal Proclamation
of 1763 and treaties), which now “form the framework of the Aboriginal
Constitution”.23 Drawing on Haida Nation (2004) and Manitoba Métis
(2013), Slattery writes, “The principle [of the honour of the Crown] lies
at the base of the Canadian constitutional order and governs the actions
of the Crown from the initial assertion of sovereignty onward.”24 Kent
McNeil has similarly argued that maintaining a fiduciary duty and
upholding the honour of the Crown “derives from the political and moral
import of the act of sovereign acquisition itself”.25
On this point of sovereignty, we might usefully step back to ask: what
is “the Crown”? The nuances of this question were at the heart of the
decision in Mikisew Cree (2018). In politics and law, the Canadian
Crown is a corporation sole, which is a legal personality: “this legal
person personifies the Canadian state and acts as the guarantor of the rule
of law and the underlying authority behind Canada’s institutions. … As a
legal person, the Crown can hold property and enter into contracts.
21

Id., 28.
R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.).
23
Brian Slattery, ‟The Aboriginal Constitution”, The Supreme Court Law Review:
Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 67, (2014), 319.
24
Id., 320-21.
25
Id., 365.
22
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In fact, it is for this reason that the state and the executive can legally act
as a person.”26 In its pre-modern iteration, the monarch’s power was
personal; to increase and stabilize the power of the state, the doctrine of
the “king’s two bodies” was conceived, to separate the human individual
and the body politic so that the latter would endure upon the death of the
former. In its relationship with Indigenous peoples, the personhood of the
Crown remained significant, and the nation-to-nation relationship was
seen as interpersonal. The “mystical” properties of the person-who-isnot-a-person support further critique of the “honour of the Crown”, with
Courts declining to explain the meaning or source of the term: we
“invoke (or ‘conjure’, as Borrows puts it [Borrows, 1999]) the mystical
foundation of (European) sovereign authority in Canada, without any of
the usual trappings of modern judicial discourse. In other words: the
marked epistemological hybridity of white law’s discourse about itself is
taken for granted, as if the Scientific Revolution had never
happened…”.27 Like the honour and duties of the Crown, the concept of
“the Crown” itself is a strategic invention, particularly in the context of
settler colonialism and Aboriginal title claims. The monarch is the
governor; the Crown is the territorial state.
We will use the recent Supreme Court decisions of Williams Lake
(2018) and Mikisew Cree (2018) to offer a geographical critique of the
evolution and application of these constitutional concepts as they stand at
the end of the second decade of the 21st century.

III. WILLIAMS LAKE 2018
The Williams Lake (2018) decision deals with the concepts of the
Crown, fiduciary duty, and honour of the Crown in the context of a claim
centred upon land dispossession in territory that lacks treaties. Focused
on the wrongful displacement, beginning in the 1860s, of the Williams
Lake Indian Band from their long-term village site at the head of
Williams Lake, the Band took this case to the Specific Claims Tribunal in
2009. They succeeded in arguing before the Tribunal that settlers,
26
Philippe Lagassé and James W.J. Bowden, “The Crown as Corporation Sole and the
Royal Succession: A Critique of Canada’s Succession to the Throne Act, 2013”, (2014) 23:1
Constitutional Forum, 18.
27
Mariana Valverde, “The Crown in a Multicultural Age: The Changing Epistemology of
(Post)colonial Sovereignty”, (2012) 21:1 Social & Legal Studies, 5; John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s
Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia”, (1999) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 37,
537-96.
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contrary to colonial law and obligation, took their village lands
illegitimately, and upon entry into Confederation the Federal Crown
inherited that obligation and fiduciary duty. The ruling held that in laying
out reserves in 1881, Commissioner Peter O’Reilly’s prioritization of
settler “rights” to the exclusion of Indigenous claims and rights
constituted a break from the honourable obligations of the Crown and the
abdication of its fiduciary duty. The Federal Court of Appeals overturned
the Tribunal in 2016, finding that O’Reilly reconciled the Crown’s duty
to protect Indigenous lands from settler occupation simply by setting
aside a reserve near the village site in 1881. The 2018 Supreme Court
ruling overturned the FCA ruling and reinstated the Tribunal’s findings.
At the heart of the SCC decision was the issue of the Crown’s
fiduciary duty and its application to actions during and after the colonial
era. In what they termed “an extended meaning of ‘Crown’”, the
majority confirmed that the breach of fiduciary duty by the Imperial
Crown became the responsibility of the Canadian Crown,28 an
inheritance that was noted in the terms of the specific claims process the
Tribunal oversaw. While the decision recognizes a use and occupation
claim to land by the Williams Lake band, it deploys “fiduciary duty” to
talk about Crown conduct rather than consider the legitimacy of the
Crown’s claim to territorial sovereignty in the first place. In essence,
the specific claim to place and its use is the geography recognized by the
decision. However, the fundamental political geography remains
unquestioned. At what point, by what mechanisms, and under what moral
authority did the Crown obtain underlying sovereignty to the territory in
question? By focusing the decision on the conduct of the Crown
following the assertion of territorial sovereignty, the Justices effectively
legitimate the Crown’s land claim, not the Indigenous one. There is an
unresolved tension here.
While not resolved in the decision, the reasoning in William Lake
(2018) does shine a light on this tension. The honour of the Crown is
mentioned only three times in the decision, noting that the Tribunal had
argued the honour of the Crown gives rise to a sui generis fiduciary duty
and that the Province of British Columbia is bound by it. More
frequently, the decision refers to an expected “standard of conduct”.
Despite Dickson’s assertion of the superiority and centrality of the
honour of the Crown, Williams Lake (2018) concentrates on the fiduciary
duty and an appropriate standard of conduct of the Crown in the
28

Williams Lake (2018), at paras. 102-106.
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establishment of reserves. Significantly, however, the decision also cites
the Tribunal’s view of “the fiduciary relationship grounded in the
assertion of Crown sovereignty in British Columbia”29 and that “[t]he
assertion of Crown title placed the Colony in a fiduciary relationship
with the aboriginal inhabitants”.30 The decision also notes the Tribunal’s
recognition of the nature of the interest at stake. “It was an interest in the
land on which the band had had its settlement — land with which the
band had a ‘tangible, practical and cultural connection’”, and this
“grounded” the Crown’s duty.31 Here, then, fiduciary duty does not flow
abstractly from the honour of the Crown, but materially from the
assertion of territorial sovereignty. The Crown’s territorial claim compels
a narrative of honour and duty in order to legitimate itself. In this sense,
the territorial claim serves to constitute the Crown in the first instance.

IV. MIKISEW CREE 2018
In distinction to Williams Lake (2018), the Mikisew Cree (2018)
decision is set within the context of a treaty relationship. Located in the
northeastern portion of what is today called Alberta, the Nation’s land is
part of Treaty 8.
In 2012, in response to new environmental legislation, the Mikisew
Cree went to Federal Court to insist that the Crown’s “duty to consult”
them should apply to the entire legislative process in any instance where
the aspects of the treaty relationship would be impacted by proposed
legislation. The Federal Court affirmed the Mikisew position, but the
Federal Court of Appeals overturned it. The case went before the
Supreme Court in January 2018, which decided against the Mikisew on
October 11, 2018.
This decision highlights the honour of the Crown and repeatedly
asserts that it is the grounding for the duty to consult. The majority held
that, ‟With respect to the duty to consult, the development of legislation
by ministers is legislative action that does not trigger this duty. The duty
to consult is an obligation that flows from the honour of the Crown, a
foundational principle of Aboriginal law that governs the relationship
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. This duty requires the
Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples before taking action that may
29
30
31

Id., at para. 43.
Id., at para. 114.
Id., at paras. 72-73.
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adversely affect their asserted or established rights under s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 and ensures that the Crown acts honourably by
preventing it from acting unilaterally in ways that undermine s. 35 rights.
Although the duty to consult has been recognized in a variety of
contexts, Crown conduct sufficient to trigger the duty has only been
found to include executive action or action taken on behalf of the
executive.”32 In this, the Court’s decision echoes the Mikisew Cree
decision of 2005,33 which also asserted the duty to consult flows from the
honour of the Crown and “its fiduciary duty to consult”.
Mikisew Cree (2018) takes an approach that asserts Parliamentary
supremacy over Aboriginal law, which is the contingent understanding of
Aboriginal title: ‟Recognizing that a duty to consult applies during the
law-making process may require courts to improperly trespass onto
the legislature’s domain. Parliamentary sovereignty mandates that the
legislature can make or unmake any law it wishes, within the confines of
its constitutional authority.”34 The duty to consult is thus understood as a
problem because it might interfere with what Parliament does. Aboriginal
title and law are not to be allowed to restrain Parliament and thus,
Parliament decides the boundaries of Aboriginal title and law.
The majority decision correctly notes that, in strictly constitutional
terms, the Crown is the executive and the Queen’s representative,
separate and distinct from the legislature. This is an important assertion.
To blur the difference between executive and legislative authority risks
endangering the independence of Parliament as a legislative body which
deliberates on its own terms and not merely as an instrument of the
executive. However, this elides the political geographic constitution of
the Crown in Canada in the first place.
In the concurring decision of Rowe J. et al., in Mikisew Cree (2018),
they echo the framework in Williams Lake (2018) and argue that “[t]he
honour of the Crown arises from the fiduciary duty that Canada owes to
Indigenous peoples following the assertion of sovereignty”.35 This
statement begs the same questions about the timing, means, and
legitimacy of Crown territorial claims raised above in relation to the
reasoning in Williams Lake (2018). It positions the Crown as constituted
by legitimating conduct, and implies that Indigenous territorial
32

Mikisew Cree (2018).
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.J.
No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388, 2005 SCC 69 (S.C.C.).
34
Mikisew Cree (2018).
35
Id., at para. 153.
33
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sovereignty was somehow overlain by Crown claims underwritten by
such conduct. This tension of political geography remains largely
unspoken and completely unresolved in the decision.
In their dissent in Mikisew Cree (2018), Abella and Martin JJ. offered
a broader view than the majority by pointing to the primacy of the Crown
as a legitimating tool, echoing Badger (1996): “The honour of the Crown
is always at stake in its dealings with Indigenous peoples, whether
through the exercise of legislative power or executive authority.”36
However, its geographical basis remains obscured in this formulation.
They acknowledge the assertion of the Crown’s territorial claim and
accept it without question, locating legitimacy in conduct.
As we have conceived of it, then, the honour and duties identified in
the decisions are strategic instruments deployed to secure territorial
claims. The honour of the Crown here is only aspirational; in practice the
Crown functions as a dishonourable land claim due to the ongoing failure
to reconcile itself with pre-existing Indigenous territorial sovereignty. In
this light, Mikisew Cree (2018) answers the wrong question. Rather than
who or what represents the Crown in dealing with Indigenous peoples,
the issue is how the Crown is constituted in the first place by claims of
legitimate territorial sovereignty over the lands in question.

V. THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE CROWN
When we argue that the ideas of the honour and duties of the Crown
fundamentally concern political geography, we are referring to the
politics of exercising power and control over, thereby producing, space.
We have particular interest in territoriality. By “territoriality”, we refer to
the desire for and management of territory: the placement of borders on
land and maps, and the practices, beliefs, and identities that are imagined
from and flow through them, including the concept of sovereignty.
Political geography as a field approaches territoriality as a socio-material
process whose product, territory, must be “actively made, unmade, and
made again”.37 Thus, the “reality” of political geography is constituted by
an inextricable interweaving of the materiality of land and contested
36

Id.
Anssi Paasi, “Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows”, in
David Newman, ed. Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass,
(1999), 69-88; Elizabeth Lunstrum, “Landscapes of Terror and the Unmaking of State Power in the
Mozambican ‘Civil’ War” (2009) 99:5, Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 887.
37
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ideas and practices of how it is bounded and claimed. The Crown, its
honour, and duties are the core ideas and practices underlying Canada’s
territorial claim. That claim is not natural or immutable – it is contested
by other, quite real ideas and practices. It is a political geography.
The Crown’s claim to territory in Canada is the specific product of the
evolution of a modern bureaucratic state, and not merely land claimed for
occupation and use. It “should never be conceptualized in isolation, for it
is part of a complex of state power, geography and identity”.38 Several
scholars have noted the possibility that terror and territory have the same
etymological base, and argued this would not be inconsistent with the
existing meaning and practice of territory. States threaten and exercise
violence against those who threaten their territory and thus their
authority, whether the opponents are internal or external enemies. This
“legitimate” violence is inherent to the meaning of the modern state: “To
occupy a territory is to receive sustenance and to exercise violence.
Territory is land occupied by violence.”39
As such, governments and citizens, through “a bundle of political
technologies” including “techniques for measuring land (property value)
and controlling terrain”, practice territoriality.40 These techniques
constitute much of the violence of Crown claims to territory, for they
police land access with the threat of violence in the case of transgression
of associated laws (i.e., arrest for property trespass). In Canada, the
strategic deployment in law of the idea of the “frontier” and the practices
of survey and cadastral mapping assisted colonial officials in asserting
Crown sovereignty and installing a new geographical order, both
materially and symbolically.41
Thus, territory is not merely a bounded space. Additionally,
sovereignty and physical borders do not always converge absolutely;
states exert sovereignty over non-resident citizens and beyond their
bordered jurisdictions (e.g., visa travel requirements). Nevertheless,
38
Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Borderless Worlds? Problematising Discourses of Deterritorialisation”,
(1999) 4:2 Geopolitics, 140.
39
Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
2013); Barry Hindess, “Terrortory”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 31:3 (2006), 243-257;
quotation from William Connolly, “Tocqueville, Territory and Violence”, in M.J. Shapiro and H.R.
Alker, eds. Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identities (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1996), 144.
40
Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
2013), 322-23.
41
Nicholas Blomley, “Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: the Frontier, the
Survey, and the Grid” (2003) 93:1 Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 121-41.
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sovereignty is exercised through a land base, which is transformed into
“territory”.42 This is consistent with the legal concept of jurisdiction, but the
emphasis here is on actual land as known, occupied, stewarded and
controlled rather than simply the geographical partition of authority. In this
sense, territory is continually reproduced as a contested socio-material terrain.
Beyond such techniques (and giving them a rationale), the idea at the
core of the political geography of settler colonialism in Canada is the
Crown. It is in the name of the Crown that representatives of the state
have pursued territoriality; without ontological explanation, an idea has
claimed the land. This underpinning of territorial claims squares with
Barry Hindess’s discussion of Leviathan, where he observes, “Hobbes’s
sovereign is an artificial person, a territorial state…”; the legal person
and the territorial claim are one and the same thing.43 The Crown is, by
definition, the assertion of territorial sovereignty.
In the case of British Columbia, the Crown’s claim of territorial
sovereignty arose in the first instance simply from its own aspirational
assertion and not from knowledge, occupation, stewardship or actual
control (as Baker Lake and others have asserted as source of Aboriginal
title). Haijo Westra and Peter Hutchins has called these “paper claims”,
and they are variably “justified” by the doctrine of discovery and terra
nullius.44 Moreover, the political geography of settler colonialism
pursues the “elimination” of Indigenous polities. This may be, but is not
necessarily, genocidal. It always seeks to deterritorialize, which is to
sever the relationship between Indigenous people and their land. To
establish a new colonial geography, with an inherent sense of eternal and
inevitable existence requires removing any trace of “permanence” of precolonial societies.45 These are the violent results of the techniques of
territoriality noted above. This is what the courts and governments
deploy the honour of the Crown and duty to consult to purportedly
confront, but actually conceal.
As Asch and Macklem observed about the shifting rationales for
Canadian sovereignty in the 1990 Sparrow decision, Canada’s claim is
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grounded “ultimately in what we call the settlement thesis and colonial
beliefs about the superiority of European nations”.46 These beliefs are
made manifest through geography. When it comes to territory and
sovereignty, law works through land and land works through law. As
Patrick Wolfe has argued, “settler colonization [is] a structure rather than
an event”47 and it could not establish its political geography without the
legal invention of the Crown. For settler colonialism, “the logic of
elimination…is premised on the securing — the obtaining and the
maintaining of territory”.48 As Asch and Macklem note, “nowhere in the
Constitution Act, 1867 does it actually state that the Canadian state
enjoys sovereignty over its indigenous population”. It “justifies, but is
not justified by” section 91(24) that awards jurisdiction over “Indians
and lands reserved for the Indians” to the federal government.49 This is
due to the construction of sovereignty arising from an aspirational
territorial claim that desires the land, not specific control of its residents.
Crown governments have been largely indifferent to whether Indigenous
peoples are inside or outside that territory, but if they are inside, they are
subject to Canadian law. It is in the act of securing territory that the
nation must be invented. While our narratives of nationhood speak of
cultural coherence and bottom-up processes of self-government, the
reality of settler colonialism is the opposite. Geography determines the
governed. The nation is determined after the fact.50
When Rowe J., et al. wrote in Mikisew Cree (2018), “The honour of
the Crown arises from the fiduciary duty that Canada owes to Indigenous
peoples following the assertion of sovereignty”, the order of their logic
serves to hide the empty and unstable source of the Crown’s assertion.
The assertion invokes the Crown as a spectral sovereign projected onto
polities that do not recognize its authority. In the first instance, the
Crown appears to ignore the people and claim the territory. It then treats
the people’s dissatisfaction as a problem that it has an obligation to
address. In response, courts and governments invoke the “honour of the
Crown” as a technique to assert and naturalize that claim. Seen from the
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perspective of the political geography of the Crown, the burden on its
claim arises from incomplete conquest. Discomfort with what could be
termed a failure to fully colonize — failure to eliminate Indigenous
communities and sever them from their land, failure to assimilate and
reduce them to individual subjects — has driven the courts to view that
failure as intentional and, indeed, signifying the Crown’s honour.
Thus, the presence of Indigenous people, polities, and territories
within the territory claimed by the Crown has produced the need for
shifting political strategies that would maintain the authority of the
claim. These have included extermination policies, displacement, child
theft, and assimilation. It also required a legal framework, which has
alternated between terra nullius, land theft and displacement, erasure of
land claims, devaluation of Indigenous land claims because Indigenous
peoples were deemed uncivilized, and the reduction or partition of
“Aboriginal title” as a claim of property rather than sovereignty. These
strategies were often openly racist, and none has resolved the
fundamental issue of the need to reconcile Indigenous people and their
polities with the Crown’s claim. Indigenous scholars in particular have
called for us to “examine how white possession manifests in regulatory
mechanisms, including legal decisions”,51 and consequently goes
unquestioned. Particularly in the wake of the Calder decision in 1973,
activism and legal challenges by Indigenous people have sustained their
refusal of the Crown’s claim to govern their territory. They have steadily
compelled the Canadian state to face its history and to reconcile its
actions with its stated values. The honour of the Crown and its fiduciary
duty have become legally necessary because the Crown has yet to
reconcile its land claims with the sovereign territorial claims of
Indigenous polities.52
When we speak of claims to territorial sovereignty in examining the
political geography here, there are two understandings at work. Claims
made by empires are just lines on a map – they can be drawn, redrawn
and withdrawn. Indigenous claims are inhabited and practiced by people
on the ground. The ideas of the honour and duties of the Crown arise
from and strategically serve the stabilization of the Crown’s paper claim;
the courts have represented less well Indigenous perspectives, despite the
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fact that they align with political geography theorization of sovereignty –
as the tensions we identified in Williams Lake (2018) and Mikisew Cree
(2018) show. McNeil notes that SCC decisions that have tended to treat
Aboriginal title as a use and occupation right and conceive of Aboriginal
self-governance as a separate issue reflect this.53 The effect has been to
sever Indigenous collective polities from their territories in legal
discourse. While decisions since Delgamuukw (1997) have gone some
ways towards reconnecting these severed halves of a properly conceived
Indigenous territorial sovereignty, the legitimacy of an underlying
assertion of Crown sovereignty remains unchallenged — it constitutes
the very terms of its existence and all that it recognizes.
Mikisew Cree (2018) exposes the reality of a governance structure in
which Indigenous sovereignty and the parties’ treaty obligations are
isolated from the political process. The honour of the Crown is not
meaningless, but it is empty. This hollowness is not unique to
constitutional conventions. It is not unlike the aspirational geography of
drawing a line on a map and filling it with settlement and the assertion of
political authority afterwards, as the Imperial Crown did. While it has
been recognized that the honour of the Crown is only an aspirational
concept, and one that might be actualized by the idea and practice of the
duty to consult, it must still go farther because the geographical realities
remain.
Because it answers “who is the Crown?” rather than acknowledging
the purpose of the honour of the Crown as a legal instrument, Mikisew
Cree (2018) appears to retreat from using the Crown’s honour or duties
as incentives to negotiation and Reconciliation. Used expansively, the
duty to consult has the potential to address the much larger, more
fundamental question: what legal or moral right does Canada have to
assert sovereignty over Indigenous people and their territories,
particularly in places not even covered by treaty? The honour of the
Crown concerns the way in which the Crown is going to continue to
assert sovereignty over the territory it calls Canada, despite its legally
and morally uncertain claim to do so.
Given the uncertainty, the courts have said, starting most explicitly with
Haida Nation (2004), that it is dishonourable to proceed with anything that
affects Indigenous people without consulting them. “The honour of the
Crown” and the consequent duty to consult arise directly from our political
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geography. The purpose of the invention of the duty to consult is to
provide moral grounds to secure the territorial claim of the Crown. The
courts have signaled consciously or otherwise, that they can continue to
enforce the legality of that claim only if settlers and their governments
behave honourably. While McNeil has noted the limitation of the courts to
rule on the sovereignty of Canada, he asks how the courts’ recognition of
Canada’s sovereignty as fact can be squared with the demonstrable lack of
“political and legal control of most of the province” when it claimed
British Columbia. As McNeil has put it, “in Haida Nation and Taku River,
the Court demonstrated that it was becoming uncomfortable with
unquestioned Crown sovereignty, given the realization that Indigenous
nations in the province had sovereignty (de facto, and de jure under their
own systems of law) prior to British colonization”.54 While the courts have
moved steadily towards Aboriginal title as an inherent right more than a
contingent right, both remain present. McNeil, Lindberg and Hoehn have
argued further that honourable behaviour includes “accepting the
continued existence of Indigenous sovereignty and legal systems”.55 The
political geography of British Columbia is fundamentally contested: the
Crown’s claim of territorial sovereignty is challenged by the pre-existing
polities of Indigenous peoples through their repeated claims that their
territory was never ceded.56 The courts have tried to find a balance
between order and justice (generally favouring the former as they pursue a
careful expansion of the latter), but there is a fundamental tension between
order and justice, when it concerns land and territorial sovereignty. The
peace and order of the status quo is unjust and violence-laden; a just
restoration of land rights is likely profoundly destabilizing to the Canadian
and British Columbian Governments’ idea of the spatial order. However,
we must remain mindful that the competing claims differ in their defining
characteristics: in their use of boundaries, in the relationship between
inhabitance and sovereignty, and in the legal and moral basis for their
claims.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The instruments invented by the courts to address the instability of
Canadian territorial sovereignty have brought many past injustices to the
surface and enabled a measure of redress in many cases. They have
provided a legal framework and foundation for the legitimacy of
Indigenous land and governance claims under Canadian law and a
platform for the exposure of this unresolved history. They are an attempt
and a plea for the legal to address a massive gap in the political.
Indigenous people are written into Canadian law; Indigenous polities are
not, and neither people nor polities are integrated into a politicalgeographic system marked by any kind of shared sovereignty or even
consultative architecture. In some ways, then, the Court is speaking to
the immense difficulty of upholding justice in a country with a
Parliament and an Executive that has not behaved, and still does not
behave, honourably or justly (not just legally) in securing its territorial
claims.
These instruments are limited in their capacity to address the situation
precisely because they are instruments of the courts, which are
themselves limited in their ability to restrain Crown sovereignty and the
legislative process, as Mikisew Cree (2018) made clear. The limitations
are also evident in Williams Lake (2018), in the Court’s failure to address
the larger question of sovereignty underlying individual land claims. For
all the courts’ ambition and goodwill, the available instruments are
constituted by and grounded in an acceptance of imperial sovereign
territorial claims. One might cynically read the honour of the Crown not
only as aspirational but also evasive, in that it avoids an acknowledgment
of other foundational political geographies and shared territorial
sovereignty. The stability of present Crown claims to the territory of
Canada relies upon a refusal to apply the concept of honour to the
securing of the geographical foundations of the nation.
First Nations told the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples that
Canada needed “a forum to restore and renew the relationships between
aboriginal and non-aboriginal people and that forum must embody, more
genuinely and effectively than any of our existing institutions, ‘the
honour of the Crown’”.57 Mikisew Cree (2018) seems to teach us at least
one reason why, despite the Cree’s efforts, the House of Commons
cannot be that forum, unless and until it binds itself to uphold the honour
57
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of the Crown. The courts have been more successful at holding the
Crown to its aspirations, but there too, we find limits. Are the courts
seeking to create a check on Parliament’s sovereignty, as Flannigan
argued, or are they acknowledging one?
Territory is not a neutral entity. The incomplete project of settler
colonialism in British Columbia exposes the “Crown” as no mere
governor, but a violent territorial claim. In our view, Williams Lake
(2018) and Mikisew Cree (2018) demonstrate that Crown claims to
territory in Canada remain an unstable project of political geography, in
which the Court plays both a disruptive and accommodating role.
Understanding that the Crown is a land claim reveals more clearly the
political work being done by the legal instruments of its duties and
honour. The legitimacy of the Crown’s claim is in dispute; in British
Columbia, its legitimacy is tenuous, at best. Instruments that assist the
courts in addressing their assessment of Aboriginal also serve to
normalize the Crown’s claim and guard it from scrutiny. And yet: as the
political bodies of the government continue to delay or refuse
negotiations that might reconcile the Crown’s claim with Indigenous
peoples, the courts’ efforts to incentivize negotiations help to expose the
instability of the Crown’s position. Any act of creating and enforcing
exclusive territory is an unstable act that will require vigilance and
violence to maintain. In the case of settler colonialism, the instability is
increased, as the creation of territory is predicated on the imposition of
one polity on top of another, and that entails either the latter’s consent or
elimination.

